The emerging wave of mega-FTAs during the global economic crisis era has so far attracted considerable academic attention. This paper primarily investigates two of the mega-FTAs, namely TPP and RCEP, from the perspective of Japan. It focuses on Japan's role and interests in the launch of mega-FTAs and how Japan tries to keep them on track, with protectionism on the rise worldwide (particularly on the US side).
Introduction
The aim of this study is to investigate two mega-FTAs, namely TPP and RCEP, from the point of view of Japan, which has played a crucial role in launching the newly emerged wave of mega-FTAs. Japan's accession to TPP negotiations and its participation in other megaFTAs marked a bold change in its trade policy. Japan is aiming to boost its economic growth through external relations.
Since US withdrawal from TPP in early 2017, Japan has undertaken a leading role in keeping TPP and other mega-FTAs on track and contributed much to their launch. The development of regionalism in the Asia-Pacific (including FTAs) has been mainly formed by the interplay among China, Japan and the United States, the results of which can also be recognised throughout the whole study, which is structured as follows: the first section gives a short overview on the emergence of mega-FTAs and the main motivations behind their launch; the second section compares TPP and RCEP by considering their antecedents, progress, aims and content and the current stage of their development; the third section focuses on the main shifting points of Japan's trade policy from multilateralism (GATT/WTO) to bilateralism (bilateral FTAs) and finally to mega-FTAs; the fourth section reveals the main economic (political) interests of Japan in participating in mega-FTAs and keeping them on track during the global rise of protectionism; and the final section closes the study with some conclusions. 
Mega-FTAs in the world economy

Mega-FTAs are deep integration partnerships in the form of FTAs between countries or
regions with a major share of world trade and FDI, and in which two or more of the parties serve as hubs in global value chains/global production networks (i.e. the US, the EU (Germany), Japan, China Schwab and Bhatia, 4 the decision to launch a mega-regional agreement is often informed by geopolitical considerations. However, the ultimate success of the negotiation and the long-term viability of the arrangement are based more on economic and commercial considerations (see the aforementioned motivations). In this study, we will also focus primarily on the economic motivations of Japan regarding the two mega-FTAs (RCEP, TPP) in the Asia-Pacific. Japan has had a strong influence on the launch of the present era of mega-FTAs. Akira Amari, Japan's former state minister in charge of TPP, strongly believes that Japan's participation in TPP has triggered the era of mega-FTAs, because there are interests in Japan that are sensitive about agricultural products, among others. 8 ASEAN+China, Japan, South Korea 9 ASEAN+China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand 10 Australia is always considered to be a reliable partner for Japan in regionalism (see APEC and its predecessors). India was taken into account as a promising investment destination for Japanese companies where they could extend their regional production networks. Both countries were also targeted by Japan to strengthen its security relations with countries other than the USA. The USA called on Japan to join the TPP negotiations in September 2009 but, fearing a backlash from agricultural organisations, Japanese PM Hatoyama avoided giving a straightforward response to the suggestion. 13 Japan joined the TPP negotiations only in July 2013. The delay in Japanese participation was partly because of the protracted internal debate in Japan, but Japan`s accession was also prolonged partly because the country was powerful enough to affect the course of TPP negotiation as a whole. 14 The fundamental aim of the USA From the Japanese side there was strong resistance to the liberalisation of agriculture.
The stalled development of cooperation in the framework of APEC and the lack of adequate help from the USA and the IMF to resolve the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98
caused Japan to turn from Asia-Pacific (APEC) to East Asian (ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6) cooperation. And the failure to start a new WTO round in 1997, and later the slow progress of multilateral trade negotiations, resulted in a shift in Japan`s trade policy from multilateralism 24 The motivation behind PAFTA was, among other things, to counterbalance the formation and consolidation of European integration and to increase the Pacific orientation of the USA when a North Atlantic Free Trade Area was also under consideration. In the end, PAFTA was not achieved because of weak US interest. Pekka Korhonen, Japan and the Pacific Free Trade Area (New York: Routledge, 1994 Japan has made the decision, bold in comparison to the earlier EPAs, to start FTA negotiations with its biggest trading partners. While Japan was unsuccessful in gaining multilateral trade preferences in the framework of GATT/WTO, as a second-best solution it is trying to accomplish this with mega-FTAs, on separate and parallel tracks.
Japan's role and its interests in keeping RCEP and TPP on track
Japan's general economic aim of participating in TPP and RCEP is to boost its exports, which led the country's economic growth before the global financial and economic crisis, and to provide a more efficient functioning of Japanese companies investing abroad. In the case of former EPAs, Japan's aim was the same. The difference is that mega-FTAs will extend unified procedures, requirements and rules (like ROOs) of former EPAs to a bigger market, covering more countries. And mega-FTAs also cover countries with sizeable domestic markets (USA, China) which have not previously concluded any EPAs with Japan. Japan's participation in TPP has been highly motivated by the USA, which is Japan's most important (consumption goods) export market and outward FDI destination country. In case of RCEP, China in particular represents a significant economic factor for Japan because China is its largest trading partner and second biggest export partner. The statistics of direct export from Japan or at the local sales of Japanese affiliates 34 also make clear China's growing role as a consumption goods market. In addition, China is one of the few countries from the RCEP partner countries which has not concluded an EPA with Japan (as mentioned earlier), meaning there is no ongoing scheduled tariff elimination between them; only 8 per cent of China's customs tariffs against Japanese products are zero now, 35 making RCEP an important tool for Japan in increasing its market access to China.
Japan's economic growth strategy, the so-called Abenomics announced in 2012, has placed much emphasis on mega-FTAs, especially TPP, which can promote economic growth through export expansion. The extraordinary significance of TPP among FTAs for Japan was revealed by the creation of a TPP task force inside the Cabinet Office and the assignment of a state minister in charge of TPP (Mr Akira Amari). Japan's liberalisation commitments in TPP have been the highest ever, in comparison to those of former EPAs. 36 Since the whole TPP is a very ambitious FTA in terms of depth of liberalisation and scope of fields of commitments, it has become an important part of the 'third arrow' of Abenomics, which has linked TPP to long-awaited domestic structural reforms regarding agriculture, service industries and inward direct investments. The low productivity of agriculture and some service industries in comparison to the manufacturing sector is often cited as one of the reasons for Japan`s low economic growth. The opening up to international competition through liberalisation and deregulation of these sectors (especially the service sector, because agriculture represents only a tiny part of the whole GDP) could create higher economic growth.
According to the CGE model estimations of Kawasaki, 37 Japan may expect higher income gains from RCEP than from TPP. Yet when we compare the expected depth of liberalisation and scope of obligations of RCEP, which is still under negotiation, to the assumption of the model (regarding tariff removal and a decrease in non-tariff barriers), the estimates of Japan`s income gains from RCEP seem to be too optimistic. In terms of depth of liberalisation and scope of commitments, RCEP is expected to be less ambitious than TPP. As already mentioned, preferences in the framework of RCEP, which China will provide, can be significant for Japan, but the other important interest of the country related to RCEP, which JETRO and MOFA officials emphasise, 38 is the unified ROOs for the whole of East Asia to provide more efficient functioning of the wide and complex regional production networks which Japanese companies have been building in the region since the mid-1980s. In addition to this, the global economic crisis showed that East Asian countries should reduce their economic dependency on extra-regional final demand and rely more on the regional or domestic final demand. A region-wide FTA would provide a new final-demand market for East Asia through trade creation. Japan could rely more on the final demand of the growing middle class in neighbouring countries (not only in China).
Beside the economic factors, we can also identify some of the political factors which 
Conclusion
It is Japan's aim to boost its economic growth in the post-global crisis era. One of several tools is the trade policy in which there has been a sharp shift in comparison to the pre-crisis period characterised by bilateralism (bilateral FTAs) with smaller trading partners. This shift did not happen quickly, as there had been a long domestic debate (especially in the field of agriculture) even before Japan joined the TPP negotiations, but the move has caused a domino effect, the launch of other mega-FTAs. The withdrawal of the USA from TPP in early 2017 has urged Japan, which has high economic expectations regarding mega-regional FTAs (see Abenomics), to take a leading role in the realisation of TPP and the fulfilling of its original aim. By inking CPTPP with the other 10 countries in March 2018, Japan has already taken a great leap forward on this path. Japan will continue to work on keeping TPP, through CPTPP, and other mega-FTAs on track and leaving the door open for a possible return of the USA to the 'successor' of TPP.
